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A validly created express trust will generally be terminated
according to its terms, and, unless there is some intervening
policy concerned, it should not be terminated otherwise. Certain
difficulties arise, however, first, where some principle or policy
in conflict with the intention of the settlor appears, which a
court of equity feels so impelling as to warrant a departure from
the settlor's intention; secondly, where some rule of law requires
the termination of a trust, unless there is an equitable principle
involved preventing that result; thirdly, where a trust instru-
ment either fails to indicate any fixed time for the termination
of the trust, or where some uncontemplated event happens which
affects the rights of individuals who call on a court of equity to
determine the policy to be applied under the altered situation.
The English courts believe that a question of far-reaching
policy is involved under the first classification in the case of
spendthrift trusts, and in the case of absolute gifts to benefi-
ciaries, where possession is denied the beneficiary for some
period after the latter has reached his majority,' (the denial of
which policy is known in this country as the Claflin doctrine).
A similar question of policy is involved in cases where a settlor
settles his own property in trust for his sole benefit, without
reserving a power of revocation, and courts are called upon to
determine whether such settlement is irrevocable or whether the
settlor may withdraw at will from the consequences of his act.
The majority of American jurisdictions have sharply parted
company with the English courts in at least the first two respects
-the spendthrift trust doctrine, and the so-called Claflin doc-
trine. It will be interesting to discover whether there has not
been developed in this country a third doctrine somewhat parallel
to these two doctrines and in conflict with the English view. It
may be raised by the following question: may a settlor create a
trust for his own sole benefit which is irrevocable, though he may
alienate the equitable interest as under the Claflin doctrine, and
creditors may reach it?
Under the second classification, certain rules of law may be
involved which may terminate a trust regardless of the intention
of the settlor, and it is believed that the occurrence of a merger
is to be considered under this class; so, too, the case where one
person is either trustee or one of several trustees, and, at the
1 28 HALsBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND (1914) 116.
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same time, cestui or one of several cestuis. Under the third class
of cases it is necessary to consider the so-called tentative trust.
There is no common agreement as to the exact time when.the
trust is created, if at all. If one is created may it be terminated
in whole or in part by the settlor's own act? What bearing does
the death of a settlor have upon the matter? Again, courts of
equity must determine to what extent they should protect con-
tingent interests and whether the legal conclusion involved in the
rule against perpetuities, that the possibility of having issue
continues as long as life itself, should be followed. Finally, the
object of creating a private trust may have been accomplished
or may have failed, and that where there has been an express
provision made for its termination, or where no such provision
has been made. Should it be terminated, and if so should the
trustee make an express conveyance? The present paper con-
templates a consideration of these various problems.
TRUSTS CREATED FOR SETTLOR'S SOLE BENEFIT
What is the nature of a trust created for the benefit of the
settlor alone? It is well settled that his creditors can defeat it,2
and it makes no difference whether it was iLtended to be spend-
thrift or not. When such a trust is created there is usually a
provision that if the cestui should die during the continuance of
the trust, the property shall be subject to disposal under his will,
and, if he leaves no will, then it is to be transferred to those who
would take by the statute of intestate succession.
Does such a provision create any interest in possible devisees
or legatees, or in heirs or distributees? It clearly creates no
interest in beneficiaries under a possible will, because no interest
can vest under a will until the testator has died. It has some-
times been thought that heirs or distributees have a contingent
interest. Of course the trustee would be obliged to transfer to
them if there were no will, since the only other alternative
would be for him to keep. Thus, the instrument creating the
trust gives such heirs or distributees nothing they would not
otherwise have received. But precisely what is the significance
of such a provision? "A man cannot by deed inter vivos make a
gift to his own heirs or next of kin." In Doctor v. Hughes 3 the
settlor conveyed certain premises to a trustee on trust to pay
from the rents a certain sum annually to the settlor for life, and,
on his death, to convey the premises to his heirs. The intention
to make a gift to one's heirs could not be more strongly shown.
Judge Cardozo held that the settlor's two daughters took no
2 Nolan v. Nolan, 218 Pa. 135, 67 Atl. 52 (1907); Afenken v. Brinkley,
94 Tenn. 721, 31 S. W. 92 (1895); Mackason's Appeal, 42 Pa. 330 (1862).
2 225 N. Y. 305, 122 N. E. 221 (1919). Comra: Gray v. Union Trust
Co., 171 Cal. 637, 154 Pac. 306 (1915).
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interest thereunder. Their creditors could not levy on any
interest therein. Heirs must take by descent. The testator had
a reversion, not a remainder, and he did not by the words used
convert the reversion into a remainder and give them the
remainder. "A man cannot either by a conveyance at common
law, by limitation of uses, or by devise, make his right heir a
purchaser ........ Here the settlor merely and superfluously
reserved a reversion.4 This rule has been overlooked in Pennsyl-
vania.5 A different result may be reached when the word
"heirs" is to be interpreted to mean "children." 0 But in Miller
v. Fleming 7 effect was not given to such intent.
Having discovered that such a settlor-cestui can not protect
himself against the claims of creditors, and also that he has
created no interest in another, the question still remains: may
he revoke at will if no power to revoke is expressly retained, or
if the trust is expressly made irrevocable? Does such a trans-
fer to a trustee create a contractual obligation such that the
trustee has an interest in compensation to accrue, and may him-
self prevent a revocation? There is no authority for saying that
a trust will be continued for the benefit of the trustee solely, but
there is abundant authority for the statement that he alone has
no such interest as will prevent a termination of the trust., In
several cases the trustee unsuccessfully sought to resist the ter-
mination of the trust because of his own interest. In most cases
there is a conveyance to the trustee of the trust property with an
agreement for compensation for services. Such an agreement
would result at most in a unilateral contract, revocable at any
time before the services are performed.
Assuming then that no other interest is involved than that of
the cestui, may he revoke at will, with cause or without cause,
whether the original purpose is accomplished or no? Many of
41 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) 470; 2 WASIIBURN, REAL
PROPERTY (Wurts, 6th. ed. 1902) § 1525; Miller v. Fleming, 6 Mackey 397
(D. C. 1888); Alexander v. Kermel, 81 Ky. 345 (1883); Akers v. Clark,
184 Ill. 136, 56 N. E. 296 (1900); Matter of Asch, 75 App. Div. 486, 78
N. Y. Supp. 561 (1st Dept. 1902); Robinson v. Blankinship, 116 Tenn.
394, 92 S. W. 854 (1906); Phelps v. Thompson, 119 Misc. 875, 198 N. Y.
Supp. 320 (Sup. Ct. 1922); of. Brown v. Renshaw, 57 Md. 67 (1881);
Thompson v. Batts, 168 N. C. 333, 84 S. E. 347 (1915); Loring v. Eliot,
82 Mass. 568 (1860); In re Parsons, 45 Ch. D. 51 (1890); Doe v. Maxey,
12 East 589 (1810).; Read v. Erington, Cro. Eliz. 321 (1591).
Ashhurst's Appeal, 77 Pa. 464 (1875).
c Locke v. Southwood, 1 Myl. & Cr. 411 (1831); Pibus v. Mitford, 1
Vent. 372 (1686); Whipple v. Fairchild, 139 Mass. 262, 30 N. E. 89 (1885).
7 Supra note 4.
S Harrar's Estate, 244 Pa. 542, 91 Atl. 503 (1914); Fidelity Trust Co.
v. Gwynn, 206 Ky. 823, 268 S. W. 537 (1925),; Armistead v. Hartt, 97 Va.
316, 33 S. E. 616 (1899) ; Brillhart v. Mish, 99 Md. 447, 58 Atl. 28 (1904) ;
Angle v. Marshall, 55 W. Va. 671, 47 S. E. 882 (1904); Raffel v. Safe
Deposit Co., 100 Md. 141, 59 Atl. 702 (1905).
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the cases involve the transfer by a single woman of her property
in trust for her own benefit, in anticipation of marriage, in order
to prevent control of the property by her future husband. If she
marries and her husband later dies, she may usually have the
trust terminated.9 This is also the English rule.0 In Rhode
Island, she may have a re-transfer before the death of her hus-
band, since under the statutes the husband could exercise no
legal control.-1 But in Pennsylvania, whether the purpose is or
is not to protect the property from the control of her future
husband, she cannot revoke the trust. It "would afford her the
means of working her own ruin." The court will determine
whether the continuance of the trust is for her best interest.'2
In Massachusetts, also, power to revoke has been denied during
the life of the husband. It was held that a voluntary settle-
ment could be set aside only on proof of mental incapacity,
mistake, fraud or undue influence.' 3 Possibly the result in this
case could be supported on the theory that an interest vested in
possible children of the marriage, but no notice was taken of such
possible interests. It appears then, that a revocation may, except
in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, be had under such circum-
stances. But it might be urged that here the purpose of the
trust is really accomplished and that these cases do not directly
bear upon the problem of whether a sole cestui may generally
revoke without specific grounds other than his desire so to do.
It seems clear that he should be allowed to revoke if he was
over-persuaded, and if he signed an irrevocable transfer believ-
ing it to be revocable; 14 and if he has no independent advice and
the trust was created on the suggestion of the trustee. But if
those elements are not present, it has been held in Pennsylvania,5
and in Massachusetts," , that he cannot revoke. In Neal (v. BlCIC 17
the court said:
9 Dodson v. Ball, 60 Pa. 492 (1869); Raffel v. Safe Deposit Co., tlyra
note 8.
,
0 Prideaux v. Lonsdale, 1 DeG., J. & S. 433 (1863); Beatson v. Beat-
son, 12 Sim. 281 (1841); Maber v. Hobbs, 2 Y. & C. Ex. 317 (1836).
11 Nightingale v. Nightingale, 13 R. I. 113 (1880).
12 Reese v. Ruth, 13 S. & R. 434 (Pa. 1826) ; Ashhurst's Appeal, aupra
note 5. But see Russell's Appeal, 75 Pa. 269 (1874).
13 Sands v. Old Colony, 195 Blass. 575, 81 N. E. 300 (1907).
24Aylsworth v. Whitcomb, 12 R. I. 298 (1879); ef. Garnsey v. Iunday,
24 N. J. Eq. 243 (1873); Smith v. Boyd, 61 N. J. Eq. 175, 47 Atl. 816
(1901); Taylor v. Buttrick, 165 Mlass. 547, 43 N. E. 507 (1396); Nei~ler
v. Pearsall, 22 R. I. 367, 48 Atl. 8 (1901); Burton v. Burton's Trusto2, 198
Ky. 429, 248 S. W. 1031 (1923) ; Middleton v. Shelby Co. Trust Co., 21 Ky.
L. Rep. 183, 51 S. W. 156 (1899) ; Stone v. Pratt, 25 Ill. 25 (1860).
'
3 Neal v. Black, 177 Pa. 33, 35 At. 561 (1396); Reidy v. Small, 151
Pa. 505, 26 Atl. 602 (1893); Willard v. Integrity Trust Co., 273 Pa. 24,
116 Atl. 513 (1922); Lee's Estate, 207 Pa. 218, 56 AtL 425 (1903).6 Sands v. Old Colony Trust Co., supra note 13.
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"At first blush it would seem that one who was compos mentis
and sui juris, who has voluntarily made a deed for his own bene-
fit, and by it granted no vested right to another, should have
the power to control his own affairs and revoke the power when-
ever he felt disposed to do so."
But it declared this was not the law, and that when a mentally
inferior person, though compos mentis, and having sufficient
mental power to make the conveyance, did convey in trust, he
could not revoke it. The conveyance here was made on the advice
of the trustee who was to receive a liberal compensation, had
unlimited powers, and had given no security. In Massachusetts
the same answer was given to the cestui as to a woman who con-
veyed in contemplation of marriage and wished to revoke after
her husband's death. In Sands v. Old Colony Trust Company 1
the same court mistakenly held that an interest vested in the
heirs, and gave for. denying the right to revoke this reason-that
the heirs had a contingent interest. It seems likely also that
there was a misapplication of the Claflin doctrine. In support
of its view six prior cases were cited in all of which, however,
the result was sound because in fact others than the settlor were
interested, and so none was in point. On the other hand Mr.
Justice Holmes, when on the Massachusetts bench, held 1 that a
similar trust "was a naked one which the beneficiary could term-
inate as a matter of right." It was also held 20 that, "the trust
being created by herself, and she being the cestui que trust, might
terminate the trust at her pleasure." It is clear that a resulting
trust may be terminated at the will of the cestui, when the cestui
has paid the price and taken title in the name of another.21 In
New York, such a sole cestui may revoke under a statutory pro-
vision which allows, under proper circumstances, a revocation on
the written consent of all concerned.22 The statute, however,
was intended to apply to cases where the settlor was a different
person and not the cestui, and the case might very well have
been so decided without reference to the statute.
Finally, several courts have held that such a trust may be
revoked at will either with or without cause, and whether the
original purposes were accomplished or not. These cases are
not to be confused with those which follow the Claflin doctrine.
l7 Supra note 15.
28 Supra note 13.
19 Gannon v. Ruffin, 151 Mass. 204, 24 N. E. 37 (1890); of. Underwood
v. Boston Five Cents Bank, 141 Mass. 305, 4 N. E. 822 (1886); Pillow v.
Wade, 31 Ark. 678 (1877).
2oFarrelly v. Ladd, supra note 9.
21 Kronson v. Lipschitz, 68 N. J. Eq. 367, 60 Atl. 819 (1904) ; of. Schles-
singer v. Mallard, 70 Cal. 326, 11 Pac. 728 (1886); Carlisle Co. v. Norris,
200 Ky. 338, 254 S. W. 1044 (1923).
22 Phelps v. Thompson, supra note 4.
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It may be that a third person who creates the trust should have
the power of postponing the vesting in possession of the cestui's
interest. By what right or power shall anyone prevent the
settlor-cestui from making the fullest use of what is his ovwn?
In a recent Kentucky case 23 the court held that such a benefi-
ciary had the power to revoke without assigning any reason, and
without the consent of the trustee. Earlier contrary decisions
were exprdssly overruled which had required a sufficient reason
to be shown before a termination of the trust would be ordered.
Likewise, in Maryland, a few years ago, a far-reaching opinion
was handed down which may be regarded as going further and
giving the rationale of such result.- ' A, the life tenant of certain
lands, conveyed his interest to T in trust for his own benefit
because of the condition of his health. Later the remaindermen
petitioned for a partition of the land, having procured A's con-
sent thereto. The trustee objected, and the trust instrument
expressly provided that the trust should be irrevocable. The
court held in substance that the legal control of the trustee was
equivalent to a revocable power to manage and control the prop-
erty, and, as it was not coupled with an interest, it was revocable
at will in spite of the provision against revocability. Precisely
the same result was reached in West Virginia about the same
time in a case involving essentially the same parties, but
different property.25 That the settlor-sole beneficiary may have
a reconveyance is well settled in England.2 1-
The same principle was applied in a recent inheritance tax
case.27 H had made a will giving his property to certain benefi-
ciaries. On being advised of an increase in the inheritance tax
rate, soon to be effective under a statute already passed, he
conveyed the property described in the will to a trustee, to be
held for the purposes of his will, the interest to be paid to him-
self for life. In an action by the State Comptroller to recover
the inheritance tax upon the property so conveyed in trust, it
was held that this settlor-cestui luvd full power to recall the title
from the trustee at any time inmsmuch as ;zo one else than Mhm-
self was interested in the trust estate. Since he could cancel the
trust at will, the only final disposition he had made was by will,
and the property was subject to the inheritance tax. Here, again,
the court in effect held that the trustee had merely a revocable
power.
23 Fidelity Trust Co. v. Gwynn, supra note 8.
24 Brillhart v. Mish, supra note 8.
25 Angle v. Marshall, supra note 8.
2 6Prideaux v. Lonsdale, supra note 10; Hastings v. Orde, 11 Sim. 205
(1840); Beatson v. Beatson, supra note 10.




Where a settlor settles property in trust for his own benefit
solely, it is believed that he should have the power to terminate
the trust at will, and that the weight of authority is in accord
with this view.
Does it make a difference if a third person creates the trust
and postpones according to his own notions of propriety, the
enjoyment of the corpus? Of course if no trustee were named,
no trust would be created, and there would be no valid postpone-
ment of the vesting of the legal interest.28 This raises the prob-
lem involved in the so-called Claflin doctrine.2 9 This doctrine is
assumed to be stated with substantial accuracy somewhat as
follows: a settlor may institute a trust for the benefit of another
person, giving such cestui the entire equitable interest in the
trust res, but may postpone the transfer of the legal interest
to the beneficiary according to his own notions of propriety,
during the life of the beneficiary. A court of equity will not
in such case decree the transfer of the legal title contrary to
the expressed desire of the settlor.
The English rule seems clearly to be that when a trust is
established by a third person for the benefit of a sole cestui, and
the enjoyment of the corpus is merely postponed, the cestui if
sui juris may have the trust terminated.30 The same rule applies
when the beneficiary is a charity,31 and to the case where the
beneficiary is a mere annuitant, for he may have the value of the
annuity, since it would be idle to direct the purchase of an
annuity which the beneficiary could sell at once.32 The English
courts then deny the power of a settlor to give the entire equit-
able interest to a cestui, who is sui juris, and also to postpone
the enjoyment of the corpus in possession. The principle would
seem to be the same whether the postponement were for the
life of the beneficiary or for a term of years.
A similar rule was followed in Michigan, though the trust was
active, inasmuch as there was no means of preventing the bene-
28 Estate of Ogden, 78 Cal. App. 412, 248 Pac. 680 (1926); see '(1926)
36 YALE LAw JOURNAL 284.
20 Claflin v. Claflin, 149 Mass. 18, 20 N. E. 454 (1889). For the question
of this indistructability of trusts and the application of the Rule against
Perpetuities, see KALEs, FuTuRE INTERESTS (2d ed. 1923) §§ 658-661.
80 Saunders v. Vautier, 4 Beavan 115 (1841); Supple v. Suffolk Sav.
Bank, 198 Mass. 393, 84 N. E. 432 (1908); see (1925) 38 HARV. L. ReV.
838; (1925) 9 MINN. L. Rnv. 562.
3' Wharton v. Masterman [1895] A. C. 186.
32 Stokes v. Cheek, 28 Beavan 620 (1860) ; Parker v. Cobe, 208 Mass. 260,
94 N. E. 476 (1911); Matter of Cole, 174 App. Div. 534, 161 N. Y. Supp.
120 (2d Dept. 1916). This result would not obtain where there was a
contingent gift over. In re Dempster [1915] 1 Ch. 795; see Scott, Control
of Property by the Dead (1917) 65 U. PA. L. REv. 527, 632, 647-650.
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ficiary from alienating his entire interest, thus defeating the
purpose of the settlor 3 3 In two early cases, Massachusetts seems
to have held the same way. Thus, in Smith v. Har'izgton,-,5 the
court said:
"The principle is that when property is given ..... to certain
persons ........ to be used for their benefit in such a way that
no one else can have an interest in it, they thereby become in
effect the absolute owners of it, and may exercise all the rights
belonginj to that relation."
Again, in Sears v. Cwate,3 the trustee was to pay the cestui a
sum of money on the latter reaching his majority, then an
annuity in varying amounts for life, but there was no gift over
of the corpus. The equitable remainder therefore vested in the
equitable life tenant by intestate succession. The court held that
since the cestui could alienate his interest, and his creditors
could reach the property, there was no sufficient reason why the
trust should not terminate. In Black v. Bailey '( a similar trust
was terminated, the reason assigned being not that given by the
English and some American courts, but because the expense of
maintenance was proportionately too large. Whether there is
one cestui or several would seem to make no difference, provided
they are all sui juris and consent. In California it has been held
that, if the beneficiaries are all szi juris and join in the request,
the trust should be terminated; 3 as also in Virginia and in
Maine.38 But in these latter cases there was no clearly specified
period of postponement.
Suppose tHe beneficiary for life or for years should acquire
the remainder either by purchase or by descent; would that make
a difference? There are five situations: (a) the equitable life
beneficiary acquires the legal remainder; :1 (b) the equitable life
- Bennett v. Chapin, 77 Mich. 526, 43 N. "W. 893 (1889); ef. also
Turnage v. Green, 55 N. C. 63 (1854); Huber v. Donoghue, 49 N. J. Eq.
125, 23 AtI. 495 (1892); Camden Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Guerin, E9
N. J. Eq. 556, 105 Atl. 189 (1918); Sanford v. Lackland, 21 Fed. Cas.
358 (C. C. 8th, 1871) (where the beneficiary became bankrupt and the
trustee was required to pay the corpus over to his trustee in banlruptcy) ;
Peugnet v. Berthold, 183 Mo. 61, 81 S. W. 874 (1904); Rector v. Dalby, 98
Mo. App. 189, 71 S. W. 1078 (1903).
34 nSmith v. Harrington, 4 Allen 566 (Mass. 1862).
1z146 Mass. 395, 15 N. E. 786 (1888).
36 142 Ark. 201, 218 S. W. 210 (1920).
37Eakle v. Ingram, 142 Cal. 15, 75 Pac. 566 (1904). Accord: Carney v.
Byron, 19 R. . 283, 36 Atl. 5 (1895).
3S Armistead v. Hartt, supra note 8; Paine v. Forsaith, 86 Me. 357, 30
Atl. 11 (1894); cf. Cleveland v. Hampden Say. Bank, 182 Mass. 110, 65
N. E. 27 (1902); cf. also Brown v. Owsley, 198 Ky. 344, 248 S. W. 889
(1923) ; see also Reel v. Hansboro Bank, 52 N. D. 182, 201 N. W. 861 (1924).
39 Ormsby v. Dumesnil, 91 Ky. 601, 16 S. W. 459 (1891); Inches v. Hill,
106 Mass. 575 (1871); Taylor v. Enecutors of Huber, 13 Ohio St. 288
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tenant surrenders to the legal remainderman; 40 (c) the equit-
able life tenant and the legal remainderman convey to a third
person; 41 (d) the trustee is or becomes one of several cestuis or
the cestui is or becomes one of several trustees; 42 (e) the equit-
able life tenant acquires the absolute equitable remainder.
43
In these situations it is frequently said that the trust will be
terminated because there is a merger, but that is clearly not an
accurate use of the term. In the first situation, unless the trustee
k1862) ; Simmons v. Northwestern Trust Co., 136 Minn. 357, 162 N. W. 450
(1917); Bowlin v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 131 Ark. 97, 198 S. W. 288
(1917); Mendenhall v. Hampton, 151 Pa. 214, 25 Atl. 44 (1892); Langley
v. Conlan, 212 Mass. 135, 98 N. E. 1064 (1912); In re Radcliffe [1892]
1 Ch. 227; Wills v. Cooper, 25 N. J. L. 137 (1855); Peugnet v. Borthold,
supra note 33; Thom v. Thom, 95 Va. 413, 28 S. E. 583 (1897); Smith v.
Smith, 70 Mo. App. 448 (1897); Asche v. Asche, 113 N. Y. 232, 21 N. E.
70 (1889) ; Matter of Barber, 36 Misc. 433, 73 N. Y. Supp. 749 (Sur. 1901) ;
Connolly v. Conolly, 122 App. Div. 492, 107 N. Y. Supp. 185 (2d Dept.
1907); Matter of Bloodgood, 184 App. Div. 798, 172 N. Y. Supp. 509 (3d
Dept. 1918); Shower's Estate, 211 Pa. 297, 60 Atl. 789 (1905); Knight's
Estate, 235 Pa. 149, 83 Atl. 709 (1912); Jourqlman v. Massengill, 86 Tenn.
81, 5 S. W. 719 (1887); Martin v. Pine, 79 Hun 426, 29 N. Y. Supp. 995
(Sup. Ct. 1894); Hadley v. Hadley, 147 Ind. 423, 46 N. E. 823 (1897);
Brock v. Conkwright, 179 Ky. 555, 200 S. W. 962 (1918); Barbour v.
Weld, 201 Mass. 513, 87 N. E. 909 (1909); Stone Petitioner, 138 Mass. 476
(1885); Culbertson's Appeal, 76 Pa. 145 (1874); Hildreth v. Eliot, 8 Pick.
293 (Mass. 1829); Bowditch v. Andrew, 8 Allen 339 (Mass. 1864); Price's
Estate, 260 Pa. 376, 103 Atl. 893 (1918); Sears v. Choate, supra note 35;
Nicklas v. Parker, 71 N. J. Eq. 777, 61 Atl 267, 71 At]. 1135 (1907);
:Bradstreet v. Kinsella, 76 Mo. 63 (1882); Hayward v. Tacoma. Bank, 88
Wash. 542, 153 Pac. 352 (1915).
40 Stafford's Estate, 258 Pa. 595, 102 Atl. 222 (1917) ; Brophy v. Lawler,
107 Ill. 284 (1883) ; Bronson v. Thompson, 77 Conn. 214, 58 Atl. 692 (1904);
Wenzel v. Powder, 100 Md. 36, 59 Atl. 194 (1904).
-Brooks v. Davis, 82 N. J. Eq. 118, 88 Atl. 178 (1913); Brillhart v.
Mfsh, supra note 8; Lee v. Oates, 171 N. C. 717, 88 S. E. 889 (1916);
Smith v. Moore, 142 X. C. 277, 55 S. E. 275 (1906); Ives v. Harris, 7
R. I. 413 (1863).
42 Woodward v. James, 115 N. Y. 346, 22 N. E. 150 (1889); Haendle v.
Stewart, 84 App. Div. 274, 82 N. Y. Supp. 823 (1st Dept. 1903); Irving v.
Irving, 21 Misc. 743, 47 N. Y. Supp. 1052 (Sup. Ct. 1897); Rogers v.
Rogers, 111 N. Y. 228, 18 N. E. 636 (1888); Rankine v. Metzger, 69 App.
Div. 264, 74 N. Y. Supp. 649 (1st Dept. 1902) ; Losey v. Stanley, 147 N. Y,
560, 42 N. E. 8 (1895); Swisher v. Swisher, 157 Iowa 55, 137 N. W. 1076
(1912); Spengler v. Kuhn, 212 Ill. 186, 72 N. E. 214 (1904); Burbach v.
Burbach, 217 Ill. 547, 75 N. E. 519 (1905); Hagan v. Varney, 147 Ill. 281,
35 N. E. 219 (1893); Summers v. Higley, 191 Ill. 193, 60 N. E. 969 (1901);
People v. Donohue, 70 Hun 317, 24 N. Y. Supp. 437 (Sup. Ct. 1893) ; Price's
Estate, supra note 39; Maher v. Maher, 207 Ky. 360, 269 S. IV. 287 (1924);
Gibson v. Gibson, 280 Mo. 519, 219 S. W. 561 (1920); Miller v. Rosen-
berger, 144 Mo. 292, 46 S. W. 167 (1898); Story v. Palmer, 46 N. J. Eq.
1, 18 Atl 363 (1889); In re Dewey's Estate, 45 Utah 98, 143 Pac. 124
(1914); Robertson v. de Brulatour, 111 App. Div. 882, 98 N. Y. S'.Ipp. 15
(1st Dept. 1906).
43 Sears v. Choate, supra note 35.
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joins, a legal remainder does not coalesce with the equitable life
estate. In the fourth one there is no merger where there are
either more cestuis than trustees, or more trustees than cestuis,
because the cestuis, as such, have individual interests, but the
interests of the trustees are joint. In the last situation, it should
make no difference whether the cestuis' interest was absolute in
the original creation, or whether it became absolute later. So
far as calling for the legal title is concerned, there is no problem
of merger.
The fact of merger is not the real reason. Where the life
cestui has alienated his interest, either to the remainderman, or
to a third person, the real reason for terminating the trust is
that the object, the protection of the life cestui, can no longer be
accomplished, and there exists no further reason for the separa-
tion of the legal and equitable titles. In B'oson '. Thowpson 1
where the legal remainderman acquired the equitable interest, it
was said that no merger would arise without the consent of the
court. In Ives v. Harris -15 the beneficiary of an equitable fee
conveyed to another who was allowed to terminate the trust.
Where the equitable life tenant acquires the legal, remainder,
as well as where he acquires the equitable remainder, it is not
quite so clear that the original object of the trust can no longer
be accomplished. In general, however, the same result is
reached,46 except when the trust is spendthrift.47 If the purpose
was the protection of the legal remainderman, of course that
reason no longer remains.4 8 Frequently a partition is called for
where the equitable life tenant acquires only a partial interest
in the remainder.' 9 One reason for the general result may be
that this situation is often called a merger, and further, it
resembles the other types of cases. Not all courts, however, per-
mit the trust to be terminated, even though the trust was not
spendthrift.2°
If the original trust purpose can no longer te accomplished,
it is within the competency of a court of chancery to terminate
the same, and a constructive trust arises for the benefit of the
settlor or his heirs, as a rule, where there was no consideration
4 Supra note 40.
45 Supra note 41.4 By Statute in New York. Cf. Peugnet v. Berthold, sap;'a note ' 3.
47Bowlin v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., avpra note 39; Mason v. Rhode
Island Hospital Trust Co., 78 Conn. 81, 61 At]. 57 (1905); Losy v. Stanley,
supra note 42.
4 8Sharpless' Estate, supra note 39.
49 Inches v. Hill, supra note 39; In re Radcliffe, supra note 'J9; Wills v.
Cooper, supra note 39; Bowditch v. Andrew, spra note 39; Smith v. Smith,
supra note 39. Contra: Asche v. Arsche, supra note 39.50 Knight's Estate, supra note 39; Price's Estate, supra note 39; Martin
v. Pine, supra note 39; Hildreth v. Eliot, sapra note 39.
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paid by the trustee 51 It may be desirable to modify and retain
the trust. In one case a power of sale not given by the trust
instrument was created by the court when the object of the
trust, the provision of the cestui, could not otherwise be accom-
plished. The land, the subject matter of the trust, was almost
valueless for rental purposes, but had large value if it could be
subdivided and sold for residential purposes. 2
Generally the court will not control the discretion of a
trustee; 53 but in Viall v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 4 where
the testatrix gave discretion to the trustee to transfer the trust
property to the cestui if in the judgment of the former the cestui
became competent to manage the property successfully, it was
held that the trustee should be compelled, contrary to his will,
to terminate the trust by transferring the property to the cestui.
The evidence showed that the latter was sober and thrifty and
profitably occupied his time.5
The so-called Claftin case,56 however, undoubtedly represents
51 Hartopp's Case, Cro. Eliz. 243 (1591); Salusbury v. Denton, 3 K. & J.
529 (1857); In re Great Berlin Steamboat Co., 26 Ch. D. 616 (1884);
SCOTT, CASES ON TRuSTS (1919) 357-366, nn.
52 Cary v. Cary, 309 Ill. 330, 141 N. E. 156 (1923) ; of. Knorr v. Millard,
52 Mich. 542, 18 N. W. 349 (1884); Marsh v. Reed, 184 Ill. 263, 56 N. E.
306 (1900) (to permit trustee to lease for longer time than authorized by
settlor; large loss if not done; hotel building); Gavin v. Curtin, 171 Ill.
640, 49 N. E. 523 (1898) (semble); Denegre v. Walker, 214 Ill. 113, 73
N. E. 409 (1905); Roberts v. Roberts, 259 Ill. 115, 102 N. E. 239 (1913);
Johns v. Montgomery, 265 Ill. 21, 106 N. E. 497 (1914); see Scott, Educa-
tion and the Dead Hand (1921) 34 HARv. L. Rmv. 1; In re New [1901] 2
Ch. 534 (trustees of stocks without power to sell were granted authority to
take part in" a reorganization scheme and exchange for stocks in the
reorganized companies); cf. Hale v. Hale, 146 Ill. 227, 33 N. E. 858 (1893)
(where equity authorized a sale of land because it was of little value for
rental beyond taxes and assessments).
53 See Foley v. Hastings, 139 At]. 305 (Conn. 1927).
54 45 R. 1. 432; 123 Atl. 570 (1924).
55 Gf. Barbour v. Cummings, 26 R. I. 201, 58 Atl. 660 (1904) (trustee with
discretion as to when and how much of income he shall pay cestui, required
to account and disclose the investments made).
56 Claflin v. Claflin, supra note 29; Watson v. Watson, 223 Mass. 425, 111
N. E. 904 (1916); Stier v. Nashville Trust Co., 158 Fed. 601 (C. C. A.
6th, 1908); Gunn v. Brown, 63 Md. 96 (1885); Fairfax v. Brown, 60 Md.
50 (1883); Carpenter v. Carpenter's Trustee, 119 Ky. 582, 84 S. W. 737
(1905); Stewart's Estate, 253 Pa. 277, 98 Atl. 569 (1916); Lanius v.
Fletcher, 100 Tex. 550, 101 S. W. 1076 (1907) ; Matter of Billett, 106 Misc.
229, 174 N. Y. Supp. 488 (Sur. 1919); Shallcross' Estate, 200 Pa. 122, 49
Atl. 936 (1901); Shelton v. King, 229 U. S. 90, 33 Sup. Ct. 686 (1913);
Tierney v. Fitzpatrick, 122 App. Div. 623, 107 N. Y. Supp. 527 (1st Dept.
1907); Walso v. Latterner, 140 Minn. 455, 168 N. W. 353 (1918); Gerrish
v. New Bedford Inst., 128 Mass. 159 (1880); Vines v. Vines, 143 Tenn.
517, 226 S. W. 1039 (1921); Young v. Snow, 167 Mass. 287, 45 N. 1. 686
(1897); cf. In re Fair's Estate, 103 Cal. 342, 37 Pac. 406 (1894); Wagner
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the weight of American opinion. The court believes that the
settlor's purpose should be carried out. He wishes to protect
the cestui against his own extravagance. But suppose the equit-
able interest is assignable (thus differing from a spendthrift
trust), and the cestui has assigned. It would seem now that the
trust should terminate because the object can no longer be
accomplished, and there is no purpose in maintaining a trust as
mere machinery. Massachusetts still holds that such assign-
ment does not prevent the postponement. Neither does the fact
that his creditors may seize upon the cestui's interest affect the
result in the court's opinion.57 Yet some courts, while follow-
ing the rule of the Claflin case generally, allow a termination of
the trust under special circumstances, though the purpose is not
accomplished and has not failed; as where the trust is main-
tained at too high a proportionate cost,n8 or the cestui makes out
a meritorious case for the possession of the corpus at once.z
This later came to be regarded as the rationale of the decision in
Sears v. Choate, distinguishing it from the Clafli case. Some
courts will not permit the termination of a trust in any case
where that would conflict with the settlor's intent.0
It is submitted that an unfortunate view prevents the termina-
tion of a trust where an equitable fee is granted and the bene-
ficiary calls for the legal fee, if it does not appear that the
purpose of the trust was to protect the estate of a married
woman. 61
THE SPENDTHRIFT TRUST
The doctrine of the spendthrift trust may be defined some-
what as follows: a settlor may establish a trust for the benefit
of another person and by the use of proper words may insure
that such cestui shall have the benefit of the income of the trust
res for life or any shorter period. The interest of the cestui is
not liable to be taken for his debts, and probably cannot be
alienated by him. In most states the doctrine does not apply to
equitable fees in land, nor to absolute equitable interests in
personalty. This paper is not concerned primarily with the
doctrine as a whole, but with only certain features of it or situa-
tions that look like it, and with the question of whether the trust
in these other situations may be terminated.
It is a well established rule that a spendthrift trust, created
v. Wagner, 244 Ill. 101, 91 N. E. 66 (1910). But cf. Ealde v. Ingram,
supra note 37; Estate of Yates, 170 Cal. 254, 149 Pac. 555 (1915); De
Ladson v. Crawford, 93 Conn. 402, 106 AtL. 326 (1919).
5 Young v. Snow, smpra note 56.
zi8 Black v. Bailey, 142 Ark. 201, 218 S. W. 210 (1920).
59 Bennett v. Nashville Trust Co., 127 Tenn. 126, 153 S. W. 840 (1913).
60 Stewart's Estate, supra note 56; Matter of Billett, supra note 50.
- Gunn v. Brown, supra note 56; Martin v. Pine, supra note 39; cf. Arche
v. Asche, supra note 39.
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by the settlor for the settlor's own benefit, is ineffective as
against the claim of creditors.62 In Egbert v. De Solms, 3 where
the husband and wife created a trust for their own benefit for
life and gave the corpus over to their children, it was held that
the trust was ineffective except as to the remainder to the chil-
dren, which vested in the children. In McIlvaine 'v. Smith 01
it was held that while such a trust was invalid, yet levy of ex-
ecution in legal proceedings could not be had, for it was not
liable to common law execution. In Bank of Commerce v. Cham-
bers "- the wife had created a trust to pay the income to her
husband for life free from the claims of his creditors. Such
trust without more would have been valid, since the spendthrift
trust rule prevails in Missouri, but in order for the husband to
avail himself of this equitable interest created by his wife's
will, he was obliged to surrender his right of curtesy in her
land. It was held that he thereby became a purchaser of his
interest in the spendthrift trust, and therefore the situation
was similar to the case where one creates a spendthrift trust
for his own benefit and that the property so received is liable
to the claims of creditors. Similarly, in McColgan v. Magee,0
the settlor had given property on a spendthrift trust for the
benefit of his four sons with a provision, however, that they
might terminate this trust by mutual agreement. The sons
by agreement, terminated this trust, but as a part of the agree-
ment a similar trust was created of the share of one of them,
A. It was held, therefore, that since A paid a consideration
for his interest in this new trust, the said trust was invalid.
The gift was not from the brothers, and they gave up nothing
of interest to themselves, but merely made his contingent right
a vested one. In New York it has been held that the statute,
forbidding the disposing by the cestui of his interest in earn-
ings and profits from land does not apply in cases where a trust
is created by the settlor for his own benefit. 7
However much a settlor may intend to create a trust, if he
does not separate the beneficial from the legal interests, no
spendthrift trust can be created, as for example, in Hahn v.
62 Mackason's Appeal, 42 Pa. 330 (1862); Petty v. Moores Brook Sani-
tarium, 110 Va. 815, 67 S. E. 355 (1910); Ghormley v. Smith, 139 Pa. 584,
21 Atl. 135 (1891); Jackson v. Von Zedlitz, 136 Mass. 342 (1884);
Simonin's Estate, 260 Pa. 395, 103 Atl. 927 (1918); Warner v. Rice, 66
Md. 436, 8 Atl. 84 (1887) ; Nolan v. Nolan, supra note 2; Hackley v. Littell,
150 Mich. 106, 113 N. W. 787 (1907); Mason v. Rhode Island Hospital
Trust Co., supra note 47.
63218 Pa. 207, 67 Atl. 212 (1907).
6442 Mo. 45 (1867).
6596 Mo. 439, 10 S. W. 38 (1888).
68 172 Cal. 182, 155 Pac. 995 (1916).




Hutchinson,, s where the settlor gave her property to her husband
in trust. The husband, however, was given the privilege of using
as much of the income as he desired, and it was not to be liable
for his debts. The remainder was to go over to her children.
No trust having been created, and since he was the holder of
the legal title for life, his interest is liable for the payment of
his debts. 9
The idea of spendthrift trust has taken a very firm hold in
this country. To such an extent is this true that in many cases
spendthrift trusts have been created by the court rather than
by the settlor. That is to say, the court has found an intention
on the part of the settlor to create a spendthrift trust where
there were no earmarks of the same, such as were at one time
thought to be necessary.70 But it was held that support out of a
particular fund made the interest inalienable, though a mere
trust for support does not create a spendthrift trust. In Penn-
sylvania it has been considered that the fact that there was no
gift over after the so-called spendthrift trust for life is im-
material.7 1  In Stambavgh's Estate 72 a spendthrift trust was
held to have been created, though there was little indication
of an intention to create such a trust. In Kreb's Estate 7 the
settlor ordered the trustee to pay one of his children sufficient
to meet his wants, and the court held that "the creation of
a trust, whether temporary or continuous, is entirely consistent
with the devise of an absolute interest." In this case the trust
consisted both of realty and of personalty. It has been some-
times asserted that a trust in England may even be valid though
the only active duty is to stand between the cestui and his credi-
tors.74
In New York, by statute, if there is a direction to apply the
rents and profits to the use of a cestui, the trust is necessarily
68s 159 Pa. 133, 28 Atl. 167 (1893).
09 See also Goe's Estate, 146 Pa. 431, 23 Atl. 383 (1892) ; Ritter's Estate,
148 Pa. 577, 24 AtI. 120 (1892); Tilton v. Davidson, 98 Mle. 55, 5G At.
215 (1903).
,0Hartley v. Unknown Heirs, 281 Ill. 321, 117 N. E. 995 (1917); ef.
Filkins v. Severn, 127 Iowa 738, 104 N. W. 346 (1905); Mason v. Rhode
Island Hospital Trust Co., supra note 47; Shower's Estate, supr note 39
(1905); cf. (1926) 35 YALE LAw JoURNAL 767. Contra: Henson v. Wright,
88 Tenn. 501, 12 S. W. 1035 (1890); Bronson v. Thompson, spra note 40;
Wenzel v. Powder, supra note 40. For a discussion of the statutory pro-
vision in Connecticut, see Foley v. Hastings, supra note 53. A spendthrift
trust is illegal in Rhode Island. See Petition of Smyth, 139 At]. 051 (R.
I. 1927).
7 1Shower's Estate, supra note 39; Minnich's Estate, 206 Pa. 405, 55 At.
1067 (1903).
72135 Pa. 585, 19 Atl. 1058 (1890). But see Thompson v. Zurich State
Bank, 260 Pac. 658 (Kan. 1927).
IS 184 Pa. 222, 39 Atl. 66 (1898).
74 See Jourolman v. Massengill, supra note 39.
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spendthrift, since the beneficiary cannot, on account of the
statute, assign his interest. It is also provided that where the
gift is for support, a creditor can get the surplus beyond what
may be necessary for the support.75
It is considered in Pennsylvania that the gift of net income
from property does not create a fee estate, although there is no
gift over; that in order that the gift of income (that is to say,
rents and profits on land or interest from funds) may create
a fee where there is no gift over, the gift must be of the gross
income.70  This court also lays down the rule as to how it may be
determined whether a given trust is a spendthrift trust or not.
The evidence need not come from the instrument creating the
trust, but the court may direct its attention to the circumstances
arising 'at the time the will was made; consequently, when a
trust is created for a son, since the evidence shows the son is a
drunkard and improvident, a spendthrift trust will be held to
have been intended. The court also seems to hold that, if we
are to assume an equitable fee is created in the cestui, then the
alienation of an equitable fee may be restrained. Even though
a cestui of a spendthrift trust becomes the heir to the remainder,
the trust may not be terminated. 77
In Georgia the fact that there is a remainder over after a
life estate will not prevent the termination of a spendthrift
trust created for the life of one who is sui juris although, under
certin circumstances, it is held that a spendthrift trust may
be valid.78  Where a settlor creates a spendthrift trust for his
son for life, remainder in trust for the son's children for life,
and these same children become entitled to the remainder, the
trust may be terminated because the spendthrift trust was for
the son only, and the trust for the children was not regarded
as a spendthrift trust, and therefore the purpose was accom-
plished.7 9
THE PURPOSE OF THE TRUST IS ACCOMPLISHED OR THE
OBJECT HAS FAILED*
If a trust of land becomes passive there is the general rule
that it is terminated by the Statute of Uses, or, if the trust be
such that there is no applicable statute, it may still be term-
inated.80 But dry trusts do not constitute all those which are
*Resulting trusts are in the main beyond the purview of this section,
as are also charitable trusts.
75 Bull v. Odell, 19 App. Div. 605, 46 N. Y. Supp. 306 (2d Dept. 1897);
See COSTIGAN, CASES ON TRUSTS (1925) 457, 458 nn.
76Schuldt v. Reading Trust Co., 270 Pa. 360, 113 Atl. 545 (1921).
' Bennett v. Chapin, supra note 33.
u DeVaughn v. Hays, 140 Ga. 208, 78 S. E. 844 (1913).
79 Angell v. Angell, 28 R. I. 592, 68 Atl. 583 (1908).
80 Moll v. Gardner, 214 Ill. 248, 73 N. E. 442 (1905); cf. Behringor's
Estate, 265 Pa. 111, 108 Atl. 414 (1919); McFall v. Kirkpatrick, 236 Ill.
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held to be terminable when the purpose has been accomplished.8'
In the case of a trust established by a third person for the
benefit of a married woman, to prevent the husband from ac-
quiring interest in, or control over, the property conveyed, if
the husband dies or the spouses are divorced the trust may ba
terminated as the purpose of it has been accomplished even
though the trustee has active duties to perform.82 This is partic-
ularly true in those cases where the husband himself has been
made the trustee.
There are other types of cases where the trust is terminated,
contrary to the terms of the instrument creating it, because the
purpose has been accomplished. 3  Thus, in Coltmfin v. Moore,"8
the testator created a trust, the properties to be held by the
trustee for twenty years for the purpose of raising an annuity
for his widow, remainder to his children; but if at the end of
twenty years no child nor the issue of a child was alive, the
remainder was given to the District of Columbia for the pur-
pose of establishing a trust for the benefit of destitute and re-
spectable females. The gift over was invalid, and as the trust
was being maintained at a disproportionate expense, it was
terminated in conflict with the settlor's instructions. In Re
Packer's Estate " the trust to continue for twenty-one years
was terminated before the period expired. In Donaldson v.
281, 86 N. E. 139 (1903); Miller v. Cramer, 48 S. C. 282, 26 S. E. 657
(1897); Allen v. Allen's Trustee, 141 Ky. 689, 133 S. W. 543 (1911); see
Hooper v. Felgner, 80 Md. 262 (1894). For a peculiar situation where
the trust could not be terminated although the purpose had either been
accomplished, or could no longer be accomplished, see Russian Reinsurance
Co. v. Stoddard, 240 N. Y. 149, 147 N. E. 703 (1925); (1925) 39 HArv. L.
REv. 127.
81 Roberts v. Moseley, 51 Mo. 282 (1873).
82 Simmons v. Northwestern Trust Co., supra note 39; In re Estate of
Cornils, 167 Iowa 196, 149 N. W. 65 (1914); Hastings v. Orde, 11 Sine. 205
(1840) ; M cNeer v. Patrick, 93 Neb. 746, 142 N. W. 283 (1913) ; Wilbert's
Estate, 166 Pa. 113, 30 AtL. 1022 (1895); Miller v. Simonton, 5 S. C. 20
(1873) ; Megargee v. Naglee, 64 Pa. 216 (1870) ; Cary v. Slead, 220 Inl. 508,
77 N. E. 234 (1906) ; Parker v. Converse, 5 Gray 336 (Mlass. 1855) ; Dodson
v. Ball, supra note 9; Mitchell v. Mitchell, 35 Miss. 108 (1858).
83Toner v. Collins, 67 Iowa 369, 25 N. IV. 287 (1885); Baker v. MicAden,
118 N. C. 740, 24 S. E. 531 (1896); Angell v. Angell, szpra note '9; ef.
Williams v. Thacher, 186 Mass. 293, 71 N. E. 567 (1904) ; Brooks v. Davis,
supra note 41.
841 MacArthur 197 (D. C. 1873) ; cf. Hadley v. Hadley, mipra note 39.
8- 246 Pa. 97, 92 Atl. 65 (1914) (the trust to continue for t-wenty-one
years was terminated before the period expired); cf. Fourth & Central
Trust Co. v. Henderson Lithographing Co., 21 Ohio App. 257, 153 N. E. 125
(1926); Simmons v. Northwestern Trust Co., mspra note 39; Stafford's
Estate, supra note 40; see also Brillharb v. Mish, supra note 3; Angle v.
Marshall, supra note 8 (trust established by the cestui to continue for his
life, but held terminable at his will).
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Allen ", the testator gave both productive and unproductive
property in trust for management and sale, with discretion in
the trustee as to the time of sale. The unproductive property
was held a long time and there was but slight increase in the
value of it. The court held that this active trust should be
terminated, since the carrying charge far exceeded the benefits
accruing from continuing the trust. In Webster v. Bush k the
unexpressed reason for creating the trust by will was the fact
that the beneficiary was mentally incompetent and the court
ordered a termination of it on oral proof that that reason no
longer existed. In Tilton v. Davidson 88 the settlor gave all his
property in trust for the benefit of his two daughters, his only
heirs, paying them the income for life and giving them the
power to dispose of the corpus by will. It was not earmarked
as a spendthrift trust, though there was no doubt that the set-
tloi intended to prevent them from impairing the corpus; there
was no gift over. The trust was terminated in spite of this
intent. The mere fear of the court that the beneficiary would
not use the funds wisely does not seem sufficient to deny the
termination of the trust.8 9
So, where a trust is created for the widow of testator and
she elects to take what the law will give her, rather than under
the will, the trust may now be terminated. °0  An active trust,
created for the support of the testator's children, may be term-
inated When they leave home and marry.0 ' The trustee is not
concerned in the question personally whether or not the trust
should be terminated. 2 So, where land is held in trust for
purposes of a cemetery, and never is used in that way, or such
is later abandoned, the trust may be terminated. 3
Leaving aside for the moment the broader question whether
86 182 Mo. 626, 81 S. W. 1151 (1904) ; Fox v. Fox, 250 Ill. 384, 95 X. E.
498 (1911) (semble).
87 19 Ky. L. Rep. 565, 39 S. W. 411 (1897). This case as to the introduc-
tion of extrinsic evidence was overruled in Carpenter v. Carpenter's
Trustee, supra note 56.
88 Supra note 69, citing Sears v. Choate, supra note 35.
89 Contra: Baughman's Estate, 281 Pa. 23, 126 Atl. 58 (1924). But the
court admits that the fact that the trustee has active duties is not conclu-
sive where beneficiaries are sui juris and all consent.
90 Woodburn's Estate, 151 Pa. 586, 25 At]. 145 (1892); of. Harrar's
Estate, supra note 8.
91 Easton v. Demuth, 179 Mo. App. 722, 162 S. W. 294 (1913) ; of. Bow-
ditch v. Andrew, supra note 39; Harlow v. Weld, 104 Atl. 832 (R. I. 1918).
02 Tucker v. Grundy, 83 Ky. 540 (1886).
03 Carlisle Co. v. Norris, 200 Ky. 338, 254 S. W. 1044 (1923); Schles-
singer v. Mallard, supra note 21; See Barbour v. Weld, supra note 39 (stock
conveyed to trustee by shareholders to enable him to negotiate a sale of
other stocks; trustee failed in this purpose but misused his power; held,
stockholders may have trust terminated and title to the stock restored).
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or not a trust should be terminated whenever the beneficiaries
are all sui juris, though the trust is active, if they all join in
seeking that result, still there are situations where the settlor
has a right to say that the trust shall continue until certain
purposes are accomplished.
Thus, a trust created for the sole and separate use and benefit
of a married woman should not be terminated while the husband
is living; 04 nor one created to preserve contingent interests;93
nor one where minors are the beneficiaries, even though the
trustee and the cestuis consent; I nor where property has been
placed in trust for sale, the proceeds to be used for a certain
charitable purpose, should the trust be terminated, until it is
clear that the object cannot be accomplished;3-- nor one where
some, but not all, of the beneficiaries have died; v5 nor one where
the trustee pays the income to the cestui with an absolute dis-
cretion to pay him the principal or a part thereof.P In Owen
v. GilchrWst' 0 a Missouri corporation conveyed its property to a
trustee in order to avoid the law preventing a corporation from
holding the property under certain circumstances. The trust
was active and the trustee was given discretion as to the sale
of the property. Thereafter a majority of the cestuis requested
him to transfer the property to a new trustee, which he refused
to do. They brought an action to terminate the trust. It was
held that the trust should not be terminated so long as it was
active and the object was unaccomplished, and there was a pos-
sibility of its being carried out. Some states permit the property
to be held in trust for the benefit of majors for a period of years,
when an absolute vesting of the legal title in the beneficiaries is
provided after the period has elapsed.' 0' But this problem is
discussed infra.
If a trust is not spendthrift, and is given for the life of the
beneficiary only, and there is no gift over of the corpus, and if,
further, the life beneficiary takes the corpus as heir or distribu-
94 Wilbert's Estate, supra note 82; Robbins v. Smith, 72 Ohio St. 1, 73
N. E. 1051 (1905) ; Buch's Estate, 273 Pa. 185, 122 Atl. 239 (1923).
Or Field's Estate, 266 Pa. 474, 109 Atl. 677 (1920); Denis' Estate, 201
Pa. 616, 51 Atl. 335 (1902) ; In re Fair's Estate, supra note 56.
a0 Hill v. Hill, 49 Okla. 424, 152 Pac. 1122 (1915) (statute forbids the
transfer of land held in trust except in accordance with the trust instru-
ment, making the transfer void).
97 Spence v. Widney, 5 Cal. Unrep. Cas. 516, 46 Pac. 463 (1396). Under
these circumstances the fact that the trust was created by a conveyance
inter vivos and the settlor has died, does not change the rule.
98 Lyle v. Burke, 40 Mich. 499 (1879).
979 Russell v. Hartley, 83 Conn. 654, 78 Atl. 320 (1910) ; see Thompson v.
Zurich State Bank, supra note 72.
200 304 Mo. 330, 263 S. W. 423 (1924). See also Newport Trust Co. v.
Newton, 139 Atl. 793 (R. I. 1928).
101 Rhoads v. Rhoads, 43 Ill. 239 (1867); Armstrong v. Barber, 2309 IIl.
389, 88 N. E. 246 (1909).
YALE LAW JOURNAL
tee, such beneficiary may call for the legal title even in Penn-
sylvania, though the duties of the trustee may be active.102 This
is the English view. 10 3 But usually the Pennsylvania courts will
find the trust to be spendthrift.' T The same problem arose in
Massachusetts where the life beneficiary of the trust (there
being no gift over of the corpus) was one of the two heirs.
The cestui purchased the other's share in the remainder and
mortgaged the premises. It was held that the mortgagee ac-
quired a valid legal interest. This case however is complicated
by the fact that on failure of the trustee named by the settlor to
qualify, but after the mortgage was made, the beneficiary was
appointed trustee and a merger occurred. 05 Pennsylvania makes
a nice distinction between the gift of the gross rent or income,
and of the net rent or income, 00 which means substantially
that if the trust is active it will not be terminated, thus con-
tradicting the view expressed above. So also in Tennessee, the
active duties of the trustee prevented a termination of the trust,
though the cestui was sole heir, the court having found sufficient
ear-marks to show an intent to create a spendthrift trust.107
A private trust may well be terminated on the death of the
trustee, particularly when large discretionary powers of a per-
sonal nature are thrown upon the trustee. It is then asserted
that the discretion of the individual trustee was stipulated for,
and on his death another will not be appointed. 1' The dis-
claimer by a trustee should have no effect upon the beneficiary's
202 Wood's Estate, 261 Pa. 480, 104 Atl. 673 (1918); cf. Tilton v. David-
son, supra note 69; Connolly v. Connolly, supra note 39; Turnage v. Greene,
supra note 33.
203 Gosling v. Gosling, Johns. V. C. 265 (1859).
104 Shower's Estate, supra note 39; Knight's Estate, supra note 39.
205 Langley v. Conlan, supra note 39.
1O Schuldt v. Reading Trust Co., supra note 76; Knight's Estate, supra
note 39; In re Minnich's Estate, supra note 71.
070 Jourolman v. Massengill, supra note 39 (opinion by Justice Lurton).
The case overruled prior Tennessee decisions, denying validity to spend-
thrift trusts.
108 Russell v. Hartley, supra note 99; Brock v. Conkwright, supra note 39;
Mitchell v. Mitchell, 35 Miss. 108 (1858); Baker v. McAden, supra note 83;
Shoemaker's Appeal, 91 Pa. 134 (1878). For the case where a trust is
charitable and the settlor has imposed large discretion upon the trustee but
the latter dies before the discretion is exercised, see Thompson's Estate,
282 Pa. 30, 127 Atl. 446 (1925). In Fidelity Trust Co. v. Alexander, 243
Fed. 162 (C. C. A. 3d, 1917) the doctrine was probably improperly applied.
The trustee repudiated the trust without notice to the cestuis and the prop-
erty was distributed under his will. The statute of limitations was held to
run in favor of his executor. It does not appear that the settlor intended
the trust to terminate with the death of the trustee. Cf. Slevin v. Brown,
32 Mo. 176 (1862). But cf. Cary v. Cary, supra note 52.
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interest, nor cause a termination of the trust where one has
actually been created. 00
In general, where a trust is terminable at the request of a
single cestui, it should also be terminable at the request of
several, though carrying out the petition requires a conveyance
in parcels. It was Lord Eldon's view that a trustee could not
be compelled to convey the trust property by other descriptions
than those by which the conveyance was made to himself; that
is to say, he was not under a duty to convey in parcels."0° This
view was followed substantially in an Illinois case, 11 where the
court said that an unpaid vendor need not convey in separate
parcels, and to different persons, premises he had contracted
to transfer to the vendee. The reason in this particular case
probably was that, though the unpaid vendor had forfeited his
right to receive the purchase money, yet it was felt that he owed
the strict duty to convey only, and his duty was measured
strictly by his agreement. There is a similar declaration by the
Texas cort with respect to conveying in parcels."2- But here
the trust was for the benefit of the children of A, and some only
of the interests were vested, the others being still contingent.
It is intimated, in Tayflor v. Gravg,'" that the dictum of Lord
Eldon did not later prevail in England for it is there said that
the equitable owner is entitled to call for partition if he is in a
position to ask for the legal estate, but the parition should be
refused where the granting of it would prevent the carrying out
of the purposes of the trust, as where the trustees are to work
certain quarries, the subject matter of the trust. These active
duties prevented a partition among the beneficiaries. Where
the income of a trust is payable for the benefit of X and his
family, X does not have a separable interest, though the trust
may not be spendthrift.: If the trust is spendthrift, one of
the cestuis cannot have a partition.1" If property is given to
trustees, who at the same time are three of the five cestuis, and
they are required to sell the same, they cannot have a partition
prior to the sale."26
Under ordinary circumstances, there can be no great hardship
in requiring a trustee to convey to several assignees in severalty,
as the costs are always paid by the cestui. Not infrequently the
105 Tucker v. Grundy, supra note 92; ScoTt, op. cit. supra note 51, at 24G;
Mallott v. Wilson [1903] 2 Ch. 494; cf. Kronson v. Lipschitz, supm note 21.
110 Goodson v. Ellison, 3 Russ. 583 (1827).
3-n Stone v. Pratt, supra note 14.
1f2 Dial v. Dial, 21 Tex. 529 (1858).
11315 Ch. D. 165 (1880).
114 Petty v. Moores Brook Sanitarium, svtpra note 62.
125 Gibson v. Gibson, supra note 42.
16 Burbach v. Burbach, supra note 42.
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trustee petitions to be allowed to convey in parcels.1 7 A petition
for partition is maintainable even though the purpose of a trust
has not been accomplished, when it is shown that such purpose is
no longer possible of accomplishment. In Williams v. Thacher,18
where the trust property consisted of a mansion house, as well
as other property held in trust for the benefit of several persons,
the property was all partitioned except the mansion house. But
generally there can be no partition prior to the time provided in
the trust instrument, except in those jurisdictions which permit
the cestuis to call for the legal title when they are all suii juris
and consent.
CONTINGENT EQUITABLE INTERESTS
Just as there may be legal contingent remainders, so there
may be equitable contingent interests.119 In Cary v. CTry 120 the
gift was in trust for the benefit of A for life, then the legal title
to the heirs of A. It was held that the four living sons suffi-
ciently represented all possible contingent interests, at least for
the purpose of petitioning for the appointment of a new trustee.
Even though there may be contingent interests, the settlor may
have the conveyance set aside, where the trust was not intelli-
gently made, without independent advice, or there was mistake
or fraud in its execution.12, But voluntary settlements are en-
forced where they are intelligently made.
122
Suppose a settlor settles property in trust for the benefit of
"7'Welch v. Episcopal Theological School, 189 Mass. 108, 75 N. E. 139
(1905); cf. Henson v. Wright, 88 Tenn. 501, 12 S. W. 1035 (1890); Ives
v. Harris, 7 R. L 413 (1863).
118 186 Mass. 293, 71 N. E. 567 (1904).
" Folk v. Hughes, 100 S. C. 220, 84 S. E. 713 (1915); Scowr, op. cit.
supra note 109, at 267; Petre v. Espinasse, 2 M. & K. 496 (1834); Bill v.
Cureton, 2 M. & K. 503 (1835); King v. York Trust Co., 278 Pa. 141, 122
Atl. 227 (1923); Smith v. Boyd, supra note 14; Russell's Appeal, sitpra
note 12; Taylor v. Buttrick, supra note 14; Stone v. Pratt, supra note 14;
Greene v. Aborn, 10 R. I. 10 (1871); Johnson v. Provident Trust Co., 280
Pa. 255, 124 Atl. 436 (1924); Field's Estate, supra note 95; Stewart's
Estate, supra note 56; Brown v. Owsley, supra note 38; Whipple v. Fair-
child, supra note 6; Maher v. Maher, supra note 42; Gibson v. Gibson, supra
note 42; Cary v. Cary, supra note 52; Allen v. Allen, supra note 80; Estate
of Washburn, 11 Cal. App. 735, 106 Pac. 415 (1909); Hildreth v. Eliot,
supra note 39; Nace v. Boyer, 30 Pa. 99 (1858); In re Fair's Estate,
supra note 56. But of. Taft v. Decker, 182 Mass. 106, 65 N. E. 507 (1902);
Miller v. Douglass, 192 Wis. 486, 213 N. W. 320 (1927).
220Supra note 52.
121 Garnsey v. Munday, supra note 14; Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Yes. Jr.
273 (1807); cf. Wallace v. Industrial Trust Co., 29 R. I. 550, 73 Atl. 25
(1909).
122 Ellison v. Ellison, 6 Ves. Jr. 656 (1802); Neisler v. Pearsall, supra
note 14; Bill v. Cureton, supra note 119; Toker v. Toker, 3 DeG., J. & S.
487 (1863); Barnard v. Gantz, 140 N.' Y. 249, 35 N. E. 430 (1893).
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himself and his wife for life, remainder in trust for the children
of the marriage. Assume further that there are now no chil-
dren of the marriage, and the wife has reached an age at and
beyond which women do not normally bear children, and the
settlor and his wife wish to have the trust terminated. May
they succeed? Further, may medical testimony be introduced
to show that because of an operation or for physical ailment or
for other reasons, including that of age, the wife cannot bear
children and thus avoid the rule of Folk v. Hughcs,1-3 and have
the trust terminated? In Ricwrds v,. Safe Dcposit & Trust Co. 2
the wife was fifty-three years old, but it was held that such
evidence was inadmissable.
But the English rule in equity is different. In the case of In
re White=12 a wife was presumed to be past the period of child-
bearing, her one child having been born twenty-four years be-
fore. A long line of English chancery cases have expressed the
same view, and allowed the trust to be divested, or a possible
contingent interest to be cut off, in cases where the ages vary
from forty-nine to seventy. Perhaps the earliest case is Lc;2g
v. Hodges, 12 where the age was nearly seventy.
It is submitted that there is no sufficient justification for a
court of equity to follow for centuries the rule of the strict law,
and that good policy calls for the termination of such trusts
under these circumstances. There is no reason why the law
"23 Supra note 14.
-4 97 Md. 608, 55 AtI. 384 (1903); see Fletcher v. Los Angeles Trust
Bank, 182 Cal. 177, 187 Pac. 425 (1920); Allen v. Allen's Trustee, -vpma
note 80; May v. Bank of Hardinsburg, 150 Ky. 180, 150 S. W. 12 (1912)
(age seventy; case in equity; court thinks rule may be due to the indeli-
cacy of the acts to which an inquiry about sterility might lead); Rand .
Smith, 153 Ky. 516, 155 S. W. 1134 (1913) (age sixty-three, equity);
Quigley's Trustee v. Quigley, 161 Ky. 85, 170 S. W. 523 (1914) (equity);
Brown v. Owsley, supra note 38 (wife sixty years old); List v. Rodney, 83
Pa. 483 (1877) (age seventy-five, law); In re Dougan, 139 Ga. 351, 77 S. E.
158 (1913) (age fifty-six, physician's testimony excluded); Garner v. Dow-
ling, 58 Tenn. 48 (1872) (equity); Bowlin v. Rhode Island Trust Co., 31
R. I. 289, 76 Atl. 348 (1910); Hill v. Spencer, 196 Il1. 65, 03 N. E. 614
(1902) (bill to construe a deed); Flora v. Anderson, 67 Fed. 182 (C. C.
6th, 1895); State v. Lash, 16 N. J. L. 380 (1838). For the English
authorities see LrrWoN § 34; Co. LmT. § 28; 2 BL. CoM. *125; Jee v.
Audley, 1 Cox 324 (1787). This is the rule at law.
:25 [1901] 1 Ch. 570.
226 Jac. 585 (1822); see Lyddon v. Ellison, 19 Beavan 565 (1854) (age
fifty-six, spinster); Davidson v. Kimpton, 18 Ch. D. 213 (1881) (age fifty-
four, spinster); In re Milner's Estate, L. R. 14 Eq. 245 (1872) (lady
forty-nine married and husband still living but she had never had a child) ;
In re Widdow's Trusts, L. R. 11 Eq. 408 (1871) (widows, ages fifty-five
and fifty-three); Haynes v. Haynes, 35 L. J. Eq. 303 (1866) (spinster, age
fifty-three). The same rule was thought not applicable in Croxton v. May,
9 Ch. D. 388 (1878) where lady was fifty-four but had lived with her
husband only the last three years. Cf. In re Hocking [1898] 2 Ch. 507.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
should not subserve the interests of those who call for the legal
title.
The interests may not be contingent if the rule in Shelley's
case is applicable, and it may be applicable to equitable estates.12
So, where a trust is created to pay income to A and her sons B
and C for life, and after their decease to their heirs, an equitable
fee is created.1 8 It does not apply where the gift to life tenant
consists of the net rent."3
Where husband and wife conveyed their land to T for benefit
of the husband and wife for their lives and the life of the sur-
vivor, with power of appointment in the husband among their
issue, and, if no issue, then as the husband should appoint by
will, and if no will, to his own right heirs, the trustee reconveyed
to the husband, and this discharged the trust. So, when husband
and wife subsequently conveyed to L, and L contracted with D
to sell the same to him, specific performance was decreed against
D, since the husband had an equitable fee prior to the recon-
veyance by T and the trust was discharged by the reconveyance
(under order of court). The power in the husband to appoint
was likewise destroyed.130
Suppose S conveys to T for benefit of X for life, and T is to con-
vey to X's appointee by will, and if no will, to X's heirs. X con-
veys the equitable fee to C, and the latter appoints the remainder
by will to plaintiff, who sues C in ejectment. Ejectment will
not lie, since plaintiff does not have the legal title,131 and the
duty to convey is an active duty, and trust continues until it
is performed.'
The rule does not apply where legal title is given to a trustee
for the benefit of A for life, and on his death legal title to A's
heirs."2 The same point is made in Eshbach's Estate,"3 and
the mere receiving and paying over does not make a trust active.
Some discretion is required to make a trust active., 4 So, when
S declared himself trustee for his son A for life, but S was to
enjoy the income for his own life, remainder to the heirs of A,
2 Warner v. Sprigg, 62 Md. 14 (1884).
128k egaree v. Naglee, supra note 82; Eaton v. Tillinghast, 4 R. 1. 276
(1856); Wilson v. Harrold, 288 Ill. 388, 123 N. E. 563 (1919); Menken
v. Brinkley, supra note 2; McFall v. Kirkpatrick, 236 Ill. 281, 86 N. E.
139 (1908) ; KALES, op. cit. supra note 29, § 429; Brown v. Renshaw, tnpa
note 4; Armour v. Murray, 74 N. J. L. 351, 68 At]. 164 (1907); see (1924)
18 ILL. L. REv. 253.
129 Deniston v. Deniston, 263 Pa. 224, 106 At. 200 (1919).
2o Brown v. Renshaw, supra note 4.
13, McFall v. Kirkpatrick, supra note '128.
' ' Hartley v. Unknown Heirs, supra note 70 (court gratuitously makes
this a spendthrift trust and holds active duties end with death of A).
133 197 Pa. 153, 46 Atl. 905 (1900).
134 McKinney's Estate, 260 Pa. 123, 103 Atl. 590 (1918); Stewart's
Estate, supra note 56.
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and A predeceased S, it was held that the interest of the heirs
of A was legal, but A's life estate was equitable, and so the rule
did not apply. 35
THE TRUSTEE AS CESTUI
No trust is created where the same person is named as both
trustee and cestui, be the intention ever so clear13 1 This is
really not a merger at all, as it is sometimes called, because the
legal and equitable interests have never been separated. (Al-
though some courts hold that a trust exists where the sole trustee
is also sole cestui for his own life, remainder over at his
death) .137 It makes no difference that the settlor has earmarked
the trust as spendthi-ift.13 If the trustee is a nephew, and also
one of the cestuis, and the will contains an additional provision
that the residue is to be distributed between testator's nephews,
he cannot distribute a share of the residue to himself.'5 If T
is made trustee, and is to have a given proportion of the trust
income for his life, residue to be paid to others, it is held
as to his portion that no trust was created.8o
235 Little v. Wilcox, 119 Pa. 439, 13 Atl. 468 (1888); cf. Cary v. Cary,
spra note 52; Kreb's Estate, 184 Pa. 222, 39 At. 66 (1398); Moore's
Estate, 198 Pa. 611, 48 Atl. 884 (1901).
136 Greene v. Greene, 125 N. Y. 506, 26 N. E. 739 (1891) ; Tuck v. Knapp,
42 Mlisc. 140, 85 N. Y. Supp. 1001 (Sup. Ct. 1903); Rose v. Hatch, 125
N. Y. 427, 26 N. E. 467 (1891) ; Odom v. Morgan, 177 N. C. 367, 99 S. E.
195 (1919); Board of Directors v. Lowrance, 126 S. C. 89, 119 S. E. 383
(1923); Butler v. Godley, 12 N. C. 94 (1826); Shope v. Unlmown
Claimants, 174 Iowa 662, 156 N. IV. 850 (1916); Hahn v. Hutchinson, 159
Pa. 133, 28 Atl. 167 (1893); Goe's Estate, supra note 69; Ritter's Estate,
supra note 69; Fox's Estate, 264 Pa. 478, 107 Atl. 863 (1919); Axtell v.
Coons, 82 Fla. 158, 89 So. 419 (1921) ; Wilson v. Harrold, supra note 128;
Thompson v. Adams, 205 Ill. 552, 69 N. E. 1 (1903); Schaefer v. Schaefer,
141 Ill. 337, 31 N. E. 136 (1892); Dick v. Ricker, 222 Ill. 413, 78 N. E.
823 (1906) ; Tilton v. Davidson, supra note 102; Nellis v. Richard, 133 Cal.
617, 66 Pac. 32 (1901) ; cf. Bull v. Odell, supra note 75.
137 Sherlock v. Thompson, 167 Iowa 1, 148 N. W. 1035 (1914); Henderzon
v. Hill, 77 Tenn. 25 (1882).
138 Fox's Estate, supra note 136.
:139 In re Dewey's Estate, supra note 42; see Ann. Cas. 1918A 475,
annotation.
140 Woodward v. James, supra note 42; Swisher v. Swisher, -upra note
42; Tuck v. Knapp, supra note 136; Sherlock v. Thompson, supra note 137;
(1920) 33 HARV. L. RPv. 324; cf. Burbach v. Burbach, supra note 116; Fox's
Estate, supra note 136. Contra: Henderson v. Hill, supra 7wte 137. In
Hagan v. Varney, supra note 42, T was named trustee for her own benefit
for life, subject however to a charge for the support of her children. The
court finds that a trust was created because the obligation was imposed
on B and her heirs to convey the corpus 6n her death to her children. The
question was discussed as to how a grantee on her death could convey to
her heirs, no provision having been made for a power exercisable by will.
The court said: "The instant the fact is recognized that a trust was
imposed not in Mrs. Varney alone, but also on her heirs, all practical
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Generally, where the so-called trustee takes the income for
life and there is a gift over of the corpus, there is no trust, as
the so-called trustee takes a legal life' estate and the remainder-
man gets a legal remainder.' 4' California seems to hold that
a trust is created,'42 although there would be the same result
if no trust had been created, and there seemed to be no object
to be subserved by a trust which would not be achieved at law.
It is frequently held, especially in New York, that if the cestui
is named a co-trustee with another, and the other fails to qualify
but the cestui does qualify; or if the original trustee fails to
qualify or dies, and the cestui is thereafter named as trustee,
a valid trust was once created and will be continued. That is to
say, the court will not correct the settlor's own error in failing
properly to create a trust, but if a merger arises not due to
the settlor's error, the court will prevent the merger from hav-
ing effect.143 But the court will not permit such a cestui-trustee
alone to exercise a power of sale. 4 4  It is frequently held that,
where a trustee is only one of several cestuis, and the proportion
which goes to each cestui is not fixed, there is no merger as to
the trustee's share. 45  In Miller v. Rosenberger 114  a plot of
ground had been conveyed to certain trustees to be used for
the benefit of an unincorporated town, so that the trustees were
also some of the beneficiaries, but no merger arose.
MERGER
There are various situations where the whole legal estate and
the entire equitable interest come together in the same person
and the trust is accordingly extinguished by a merger 4 1 So
difficulty disappears." It is submitted that it is difficult for one to be sole
trustee for life for one's sole benefit though the income may be subject to a
charge. Cf. Irving v. Irving, supra note 42; Maher v. Maher, supra
note 119.
141 Schaefer v. Schaefer, supra note 136; Rose v. Hatch, supra note 136;
cf. Fox's Estate, supra note 136.
:142 Nellis v. Rickard, supra note 136.
Uz Haendle v. Stewart, supra note 42; Rogers v. Rogers, supra note 42;
Losey v. Stanley, supra note 42; Spengler v. Kuhn, supra note 42; People v.
Donohue, supra note 42; Robertson v. de Brulatour, supra note 42; of.
Rankine v. Metzger, supra note 42.
244 Irving v. Irving, supra note 42.
'14 Summers v. Higley, supra note 42; Story v. Palmer, supra note 42.
146 Supra note 42.
24'7 Conceivably there may be a merger of the equitable with the legal
interests in the following types of cases: (a) The trustee conveys to the
cestui. (b) The cestui releases to the trustee. (c) The trustee becomes
cestui Or the cestui becomes trustee. (d) The trustee and the cestui convey
to a third person. Beatson v. Beatson, supra note 10; Henson v. Wright,
supra note 117. (e) The cestui has power to convey the legal estate and
conveys it together with his equitable interest to a third person. (f) The
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if the sole trustee conveys to the sole cestui, or if the sole cestui
inherits the legal fee, the trust is terminated,*" except where
the trust is spendthrift, or the cestui's interest is inalienable by
statute. If the trust is spendthrift, equity will prevent a
merger, 149 and sometimes such transfer is held void though there
are no earmarks of a spendthrift trust.1lo
Similarly, if the cestui releases to the trustee, there is a
merger.151 Thus, in Cznbinghio v. Bright, - S purchased cer-
tain lands for development purposes and gratuitously declared
himself trustee of it for four others. The latter conveyed to S
their interests, and the land was thereafter held to be subject
to attachment for the debts of S. There is the same result when
the trustee inherits the equitable interest.5 3 Similarly, there
is a merger where the trust is a resulting trust,154 save that
several cases seem to hold that the release by the cestui does
not come within the ninth section of the Statute of Frauds, and
may be oral.3 3
trustee of a leasehold surrenders to the reversioner. Scorr, op. cit. spm~i
note 109, at 637n.; Estate of Yates, 170 Cal. 254, 149 Pac. 555 (1915).
(g) Trustee of a term marries the woman reversioner and has a freehold
in auter droit. (h) Obligor releases to obligee requiring latter to be trwitee
of the obligation for a third person. (i) The trustee dies leaving no heirs
and the lord comes in in the post and paramount to the trust by ezchcat.
(j) The trustee ex parte patenza acquires the equitable title c.- parte
9saterna or vice versa. (k) The equitable life tenant conveys to the legal
remainderman. (1) The equitable life tenant acquires the legal remainder
by purchase or by descent. (m) The equitable life tenant and the le-al
remainderman convey to a third person.
4s In re Selous [1901] 1 Ch. 921; Brooks v. Davis, 82 N. J. Eq. 118, 83
Atl. 178 (1913); Cunningham v. Bright, 228 Mass. 385, 117 N. E. 909
(1917); (1919) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL 97; Ormsby v. Dumesnil, szpra note
39; Brown v. Renshaw, supra note 4; Miller v. Simonton, supra note 82;
Smith v. Moore, 142 N. C. 277, 55 S. E. 275 (1906) ; Taft v. Decher, -,pra
note 119; Partridge v. Clary, 228 Blass. 290, 117 N. E. 332 (1917); Ivory
v. Burns, 56 Pa. 300 (1867); Brock v. Conkwright, -Ztpra note 39; Brad-
street v. Kinsella, supra note 39; cf. Wills v. Cooper, supra note 39; Cooper
v. Cooper, 5 N. J. Eq. 9 (1845); Langley v. Sneyd, 1 Sire & S. 45 (1822);
Danforth v. City of Oshkosh, 119 Wis. 262, 97 N. W. 253 (1903).
1
4 9 Rife v. Geyer, 59 Pa. 393 (1863); Hartley v. Unknown Heirs, zupra
note 70.150 Maher v. Maher, supra note 42; Gibson v. Gibson, szpra note 42.
2-' Newman v. Newman, 28 Ch. D. 674 (1883); Phipps v. Lovegrove, L.
R. 16 Eq. 80 (1873); Browne v. Savage, 4 Drew. 635 (1859).
's- Supra note 149; cf. (1919) 29 Y.LE LAW JoTn =,,A 97; Healcy v.
Alston, 25 Mliss. 190 (1852).
'53 Ivory v. Burns, supra note 149; Pedrajas v. Bloomfield Trust Co., 139
Atl. 18 (N. J. 1927).
1r4 Owings v. Owings, 3 Ind. 142 (1851); Vines v. Vines, 143 Tenn. 517,
226 S. -W. 1039 (1921).
lz3 See Matthews v. Thompson, 186 Blass. 14, 71 N. E. 93 (1904); and
cases cited in Scor, op. cit. supra note 109, at 205-6. But by exprezs
statutory provision in New York the release must be in vriting. Nestell
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In Gray v. Beard 6 the grantor conveyed his lands to T on
account of his fear of blackmail. He required a written re-
transfer which was not recorded. Thereafter he declared a
trust in favor of various persons in the same lands, but later
repurchased their claims and took releases. In order to
straighten out the record title, he executed another conveyance
to T, transferring the same premises and dated it back beyond,
the date of the declaration of trusts. The grantor died and T
now claims that this conveyance is a release of the grantor's
equitable interest, and that his record legal title merges under
this conveyance with the equitable interest. But a court of
equity prevented a merger.
Intimation of what the result is when the trustee becomes
cestui, or one of several cestuis, and when the cestui becomes
one of several trustees, has already been indicated. It is be-
lieved that it is important in all these cases from the standpoint
of formal merger, to inquire whether the situation dealt with
by the court was the one created by the settlor, or whether the
commingled or contradictory interests arose later by inheritance
or conveyance.
Likewise when the trustee and cestui convey to a third per-
son, or when the cestui has power to pass the legal title, and
executes the power and at the same time releases his equitable
interest, a merger arises." 7 If the trustee of a leasehold estate
should surrender to the reversioner, there would be a merger,
the effect of which equity in a proper case will prevent by mak-
ing the reversioner a constructive trustee." 8 It is not so clear
whether at common law a merger arises when the trustee of a
term marries the reversioner (a woman), so that the former
now has a freehold estate in auter droit.159
It seems clear enough that an obligor cannot be trustee of his
own debt for the benefit of another, though some English cases
for practical reasons have held the obligor as trustee."10 But
where such release is made to the obligor, with the intent of
making him a trustee, it seems clear that the resulting ex-
v. Hart, 202 N. Y. 280, 95 N. E. 703 (1911). In Pennsylvania it is held
that the ninth section of the Statute of Frauds applies to the surrender of
the interest of the cestui to the trustee where a resulting trust is involved.
Hatcher v. Hatcher, 264 Pa. 105, 107 Atl. 660 (1919).
256 66 Or. 59, 133 Pac. 791 (1913).
'5 Beatson v. Beatson, supra note 10; Henson v. Wright, supra note 117;
Bradstreet v. Kinsella, supra note 39; Lenen v. McComas, 63 Md. 153
(1885).
s58 Saunders v. Bournford, Finch 424 (1679).
-9 Thorn v. Newman, 3 Swanst. 603 (1673).
10 Moore v. Darton, 4 DeG. & Sm. 517 (1851).
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tinguishment in the nature of a merger, should be prevented in
equity' 6 1
Although equitable interests, as against the bare legal title,
have been of growing importance, and the tendency has been
to give effect to the former at the expense of the latter, as if the
cestui were the real owner, yet courts have shown no yielding
to this tendency in the case of ancestral estates, when the legal
estate is derived ex parte paterna and the equitable interest
comes ex parte nweterna, or vice versa. In this situation the
two interests merge, and the heir who derives his claim from
the legal title holder always prevails.11 2
There seems to be no merger at common law when the trustee
dies without heirs, and the legal estate escheats to the lord. The
latter comes in the post, and by title paramount to the trust,
and the equitable interest ceases to exist. Likewise, when the
equitable life tenant surrenders to the legal remainderman, or
where the latter releases to the former, or where both convey
to a third person there is, properly speaking, no merger. The
intervening legal estate of the trustee prevents a coalescence.
When, under these situations the trust is held terminable, it
would seem to be because the trust purpose can no longer be
fulfilled.
TERMINATION BY THE SETTLOR: THE TENTATIVE TRUST:
DEATH OF SETTLOR
If S deposits money in a savings bank in his own name as
trustee for A, and later dies with the passbook in his ovm pos-
session without withdrawing the deposit, does A get the money?
Assuming that there is no further evidence either way, New
York says, and it has been made statutoly there now, that this
is a tentative trust which becomes irrevocable at the death of S,
but only then. New Jersey says that the tentative trust theory
conflicts with the Wills Act, and Massachusetts says it may be
a trust, but if nothing more appears, the trust is not made out.
It has been said that the decision in the case of Matter of Tot-
ten'16 3 was excellent as a piece of legislation, but deplorable as
a matter of law, in that it violates fundamental principles. It
does seem to be entirely desirable that such a practice should
be recognized, whether by statute or by the courts, but is there
1 61Anon., 2 Free. Ch. 52 (1680).
162 Goodright v. Wells, 2 Doug. 771 (1781); Selby v. Alston, 3 Ve3. Jr.
339 (1797); Burgess v. Wheate, 1 B1. Win. 123 (1759); In re Douglas, 23
Ch. D. 327 (1884); Langley v. Sneyd, szpra note 149; Wade v. Paget, 1
Cox 74 (1784); Nicholson v. Halsey, 1 Johns. Ch. 417 (N. Y. 1315);
Shephard v. Taylor, 15 R. I. 204 (1835).
163179 N. Y. 112, 71 N. E. 743 (1904).
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any logical basis upon which such a result can rest apart from
statute?
To the present writer it would seem that when S makes a
deposit in trust for A, this is an unequivocal declaration; not a
promise of a future gift nor even of a present gift, but a con-
veyance without transmutation by S to A under the doctrine of
Ex parte Pye.0 4  This is not the whole of the story, for the
custom calls not merely for a present transfer of the equitable
title, but also for the power in S to revoke such a transfer, either
in whole or in part, as to interest accumulations or principal
or both. Is it possible, consistently with generally recognized
principles, to transfer the title and retain power to recall it,
without a written reservation of such power? 'c'
We have seen that when the trust purpose is accomplished,
it may be terminated. It is no objection to the existence of a
valid trust that the settlor reserves power to revoke it. It is
also seen that where the settlor creates a trust for his own bene-
fit, without giving an interest to any other person, the tendency
is to hold that he may revoke the trust at will, though not so
if others are interested. What is really peculiar then,. about
the savings bank trust, is that though another person is in-
terested, still the settlor may revoke it. There is no sufficient
reason why a practice may not be recognized in such cases which
contemplates a general power of revocation, and which has the
same potency as an express reservation of power. It is clearly
a solution which meets the needs of many persons, and if the
desire of S cannot be carried out, there should be good reason
for failure to allow S his own way.
It would seem clear, however, that if the trust is in fact tenta-
tive, and title does not pass finally till death, as in New York,
then the objection raised by the New Jersey courts is sound,
the transfer is testamentary.'", Massachusetts 10T rates such a
transaction along with the gratuitous assignment of choses in
action, and requires something further to be done to prove the
intent of S to create a trust, and compares this with Cook v.
Lum 18 and Stevenson v. Earl.210 But to require the delivery of
'1 18 Ves:. Jr. 140 (1811). For a somewhat contrary view see Bogert,
Creation of Trusts by Means of Bank Deposits (1915) 1 CORN. L. Q.
159, particularly note 86; see also BOGERT, TRUSTS (1921) § 27.
105 See Wagner v. Wagner, 244 IlL 101, 91 N. E. 66 (1910).
206 Booe v. Vinson, 104 Ark. 439, 149 S. W. 524 (1912).
207 Will of Hamburger, 185 Wis. 270, 201 N. W. 267 (1924) ; (1925) 38
HARv. L. Rev. 838; Sanford v. Lackland, supra note 33; DeLadson v. Craw-
ford, supra note 56; Huston v. Dodge, 111 Me. 246, 88 At]. 888 (1913);
Reel v. Hansboro State Bank, supra note 38; Magrath v. Morehead, L. R.
12 Eq. 491 (1871); Boynton v. Gale, 194 Mass. 320, 80 N. E. 448 (1907);
cf. Matter of Billett, supra note 56.
108 55 N. J. L. 373, 26 Atl. 803 (1893) (an attempt to assign a chose in
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the pass book is to require a completed gift, and not a trust.
A is then in the same position he would have been in if the de-
posit were in the name of S only. It has also been held that if
S deposits in the name of A only, and keeps the book, still the
gift is complete. But a gift of the legal interest in the tentative
trust cases is not intended, and, except in Massachusetts, it is
not generally held that notice to the cestui is necessary to com-
plete the trust.170
Under the Massachusetts view, "S in trust for A" is am-
biguous standing alone. S may have deposited his own funds in
this manner because he already had as large an account in his
own name as the bank's by-laws permit; or there may be many
other reasons for such form of deposit. As a consequence,
evidence is admissible to show quo aizimo the deposit was made.
This seems to the writer as objectionable in its way as the New
York view. How is the form of the deposit equivocal? Why
should his secret and contrary intent, if any, control the state-
ment so written at his special request? The form is certainly
less equivocal than that in ex parte Pye, and exactly equivalent
to the written statement, "I hold this property in trust for A." ' '
The only equivocal thing has to do with the question whether
a power of revocation was or was not intended to be reserved.
New York will not permit evidence of oral declarations to ex-
plain the form, and this seems sound. In all these cases, if the
settlor having established a valid trust, does not put an end
to it by his own act prior to his death, the latter event will make
it possible for the cestui to call for the corpus of the estate.
DUTY OF THE TRUSTEE TO CONVEY
After the death of the life beneficiary, the trustee being given
the duty at that time to sell and distribute the proceeds, a con-
veyance would be necessary in order to pass a good title.72 But
in Lee v. Oates,13 where the trustee had died, it was held that
action without a deed and without the delivery of any document which
represented the chose).
169 65 N. J. Eq. 721, 55 Atl. 1091 (1893) (direction of depositor to
depositee to pay all sums left standing in former's name at his death to his
widow).
270 But cf. DeLadson v. Crawford, supra note 56.
-T1 Camden Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Guerin, supre note 33.
72 Armour v. Murray, supra note 128; see Allen v. Merrill, 223 Mich.
467, 194 N. W. 131 (1923); (1924) 33 YALE LAYW JouRNAL 331 and cases
there cited. According to Nave v. Bailey, 160 N. E. 605 (Il. 1928) a
conveyance by the beneficiary of a trust operates in equity on a trust
estate the same as it would in law on a legal estate.
173 Supra note 41; cf. Coughlin v. Deago, 53 Ga. 2,50 (1874); Sheaff'S
Estate, 231 Pa. 251, 80 Atl. 361 (1911); Harris v. Cornell, 80 Ill. 54 (1875)
(where debts of bankrupt are outlawed and the purposes of the assign-
ment are accomplished, the assignee loses title and former bankrupt is
reinvested with legal title). Compare the case where a mortgagea has
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a deed signed by the equitable life tenant and legal remainder-
man could pass a good title, and a contract to purchase the trust
premises was specifically' enforceable. In Bennett v. Bennett,"
where title to slaves was put in a trustee for the benefit of the
settlor's daughter and her children, the title was not divested
from the trustee by death of the daughter. The children could
not recover in detinue, because the Statute of Uses did not apply
to personalty. But if the trust is established for a person and
his heirs, and is not intended to continue longer than the life
of such person, then a conveyance is not required. Thus, in
Bradstreet v. Kinsella,l 5 it was held that a direction by the will
of the cestui to convey was ineffective, but the property in this
case passed under the residuary clause of her will.
Some courts make 'a distinction between a trust for use and a
trust to convey, holding that if the former becomes passive, the
Statute executes it, but in the latter case the Statute cannot
execute it.1-6 In Brillhart v. Mish;'17 and in Angle v. Mar-
been paid but has not released the mortgage. Barrett v. Hinckley, 124
I1. 32, 14 N. E. 863 (1888).
-7 217 I1. 434, 75 N. E. 339 (1905). Accord: Slevin v. Brown, supra
note 108 (a chattel real conveyed on a dry trust). But cf. Underwood v.
Boston Five Cents Bank, supra note 19 (administrator of cestui allowed
to sue at law for proceeds of deposit in bank held on a dry trust created
by the beneficiary).
175 Supra note 39; Hooper v. Felgner, supra note 80. Accord: Comby v.
McMichael, 19 Ala. 747 (1851) (where it was held that on death of life
tenant the trust came to an end and the proper remedy for the receiver
of the property was detinue rather than a bill in equity); Caughlin v.
Seago, 53 Ga. 250 (1874) (trust terminated on death of trustee and cestui
without a conveyance became vested with legal title) ; Shoemaker's Appeal,
91 Pa. 134 (1879); Moll v. Gardner, supra note 80; Smith v. Moore, 142
N. C. 277, 55 S. E. 275 (1906); McNab v. Young, 81 Ill. 11 (1875); Rush
v. Lewis, 21 Pa. 72 (1853); Fairfax v. Brown, 60 Md. 50 (1883); Reuling
v. Reuling, 137 Ky. 637, 126 S. W. 151 (1910) ; Smith v. Harrington, supra
note 34; Roberts v. Moseley, 51 Mo. 282 (1873); Mitchell v. Mitchell,
supra note 108; Kronson v. Lipschitz, supra note 21 (semble); Bellinger
v. Shafer, 2 Sandf. Ch. 324 (N.' Y. 1845) (trust to continue until
female beneficiary reached the age of twenty-one or married, then to
terminate). In Deering v. Pierce, 149 App. Div. 10, 133 N. Y. Supp. 582
(1st Dept. 1912) an action at law against the trustees would not lie prior
to an accounting. Cf. Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, 185 Ala. 155, 64 So. 594
(1914). In Hemphill's Estate, 180 Pa. 87, 36 Atl. 409 (1897) the court
points out that a trust is passive where all trustee does is to receive funds
and pay them over, since he is a mere conduit and the trust operates
automatically without the use of discretion on his part. See also Eshbach's
Estate, 197 Pa. 153, 46 At. 905 (1900); Schuldt v. Reading Trust Co.,
supra note 76; Knight's Estate, supra note 39.
ITAPhillips v. Vermeule, 88 N. J. Eq. 500, 102 At. 695 (1917) (court
observes that the difference between the two situations is evanescent);
McFall v. Kirkpatrick, supra 128. In Blake v. O'Neal, 63 W. Va. 483, 61
S. E. 410 (1908) the Statute of Uses was not in force, hence the trustee
of a passive trust continues to hold the legal title. According to Nave v.
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shail,2T- it does not appear whether it was regarded as necessary
for the trustee to convey legal title which was a matter of record,
though his interest as a trustee was regarded as a power and
revocable.
In some cases it is held that legal title passes to the beneficiary
when the trust becomes passive; "7 but in order to remove the
cloud on the latter's title equity will require a conveyance by the
trustee."80 It is sometimes asserted that the rule, that legal
title is in the beneficiary without a transfer by the trustee, ap-
plies only where the trust appears, from the instrument creat-
ing it, to be passive, and not to cases when the nature of the
trust is to be determined from circumstances dehors such in-
strument."" After a long period of time has elapsed, a transfer
of the property held under a dry trust will be presumed."' A
trust for the benefit of a married woman was not executed by
the Statute of Uses, but as soon as she should become discovert,
the use was executed and she could transfer the legal title. 3
CONCLUSION
However much we may object to the theory, spendthrift trusts
are firmly established. In spite of its inconsistencies, that the
cestui may alienate his equitable interest, and creditors may
reach it by a bill in equity, the Claflfn doctrine continues to win
new adherents. It is believed, however, that just as courts
have distinguished between spendthrift trusts created by third
Bailey, supra note 172, if the statute exrecutes a use at all it does so at the
time the use is created only.
277 Supra note 8.
178 Supra note 8.
70 By statute in California. See also Allen v. Allen, spra note S0. In
Hinds v. Hinds, 140 Atl. 189 (Me. 1928), where the trust became passive,
it was held that the cestui was entitled to a conveyance, but it was also
held that a conveyance by the cestui passed the legal title and that a
deed from the trustee was unnecessary to remove a cloud on the title, if
and when the court's decree was recorded.
380 Rothschild v. Dickinson, 169 Mich. 200, 134 N. W. 1035 (1912) ; Ring-
rose v. Gleadall, 17 Cal. App. 664, 121 Pac. 407 (1912) ; Reuling v. Reuling,
supra note 175; Schlessinger v. Mallard, supra note 21 (semble); cf.
Behringer's Estate, 265 Pa. 111, 108 Atl. 414 (1919) (trustee of dry trust
not made a party was not permitted to appeal from a decree of the court
ordering a sale of the land held in trust); Buch's Estate, svpma. note 94;
(semble). The later Illinois cases seem to require a transfer by the trustee.
Moll v. Gardner, supra note 80; Kirkland v. Cox, 94 III. 400 (1850). The
trustee cannot object to the termination of a dry trust. Armistead v. Hartt,
supra note 8; see Hinds v. Hinds, smria note 179.
39, Obermiller v. 'Wylie, 36 Fed. 641 (C. C. 6th, 1888).
182 Miller v. Cramer, 48 S. C. 282, 26 S. E. 657 (1897); Moll v. Gardner,
supra note 80; Blake v. O'Neal, supra note 176.




persons and those* created by the settlor, so they should dis-
tinguish between trusts established by a third person for the
benefit of a sole cestui, the presupposition of the Claflin doctrine,
and those instituted by the cestui for his own sole benefit. The
latter trust should be freely terminable without rhyme or reason
where the beneficiary is sui j]zris. It is the failure to note the
distinction as to the identity of the settlor that leads courts to
reach the same result in the latter two types of cases. Of course,
the settlor-cestui may alienate his equitable interest though at
a heavy sacrifice, and creditors may reach it. The attendant
loss furnishes a most serious objection to the view that such a
trust is irrevocable by the cestui. The writer suggests that there
is a policy of the law utterly opposed to the proposition that a
man can settle property on himself solely, and put it beyond
his own reach.
The writer believes that the so-called tentative trust is sound
in theory even without a statute, and that it meets a business
need. The trust is created at the moment of making the deposit.
The law of commercial paper was developed through the custom
of merchants. The law does not, or should not, reach a point
where it may not be modified by commercial practice, and such
practice gives warrant for the revocation of the tentative trust
where no such power is expressly reserved. On the other hand,
courts of equity in particular ought not to stand overlong on
outworn formulas, as is done in the protection of a class of
conceivable contingent interests above described.
It is desirable to distinguish between a merger proper, where
the equitable and legal interests in property once separated come
together in one person, and the case where originally the same
person is named both trustee and cestui. In the former situation
equity may prevent a merger in a proper case. It seems evident
also that, in the case of ancestral estates, too much reverence
continues to be paid to the form, and too little to the substance.
In any event a private trust should terminate when its purpose is
accomplished, or the object has failed. The power of chancery
to modify, or even terminate, a private trust contrary to the
expressed intent of the settlor, where an unexpected situation
has arisen, should be exercised when the equitable grounds are
clear.
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